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authorDarren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>2016-07-15 13:32:45 +1000
committerColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2016-07-22 13:58:37 +0100
commite5ef9d3942cebda819a6fd81647b51c8d87d23df (patch)
tree51e73ff68b275ee8f0555a4a9fb8b2b9ad1155f4 /openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h
parent43a633de1cabe77e652125dac394a99ad9cac3b4 (diff)
Determine appropriate salt for invalid users.
When sshd is processing a non-PAM login for a non-existent user it uses the string from the fakepw structure as the salt for crypt(3)ing the password supplied by the client. That string has a Blowfish prefix, so on systems that don't understand that crypt will fail fast due to an invalid salt, and even on those that do it may have significantly different timing from the hash methods used for real accounts (eg sha512). This allows user enumeration by, eg, sending large password strings. This was noted by EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com (CVE-2016-6210). To mitigate, use the same hash algorithm that root uses for hashing passwords for users that do not exist on the system. ok djm@ Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=9286875a73b2de7736b5e50692739d314cd8d9dc Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831902 Last-Update: 2016-07-22 Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-1.patch
Diffstat (limited to 'openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h')
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