Merge 6.7p1.

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.

1 files changed, 32 insertions, 134 deletions

diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
index 885c121f2..defd5fb61 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.17 2014/02/13 05:38:33 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.19 2014/07/02 05:28:07 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
  * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
+#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
 #include "includes.h"
 
 #include <stdarg.h>
@@ -26,147 +27,44 @@
 # include <openssl/conf.h>
 #endif
 
-#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
-# include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-
 #include "log.h"
 
-#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
 #include "openssl-compat.h"
 
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
-int
-ssh_EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
-    unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-{
-        EVP_CipherInit(evp, type, key, iv, enc);
-        return 1;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, char *dst, char *src, int len)
-{
-        EVP_Cipher(evp, dst, src, len);
-        return 1;
-}
-
-int
-ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp)
-{
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(evp);
-        return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX
-int
-EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, void *engine)
-{
-        if (engine != NULL)
-                fatal("%s: ENGINE is not supported", __func__);
-# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
-        EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md);
-        return 1;
-# else
-        return EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md);
-# endif
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX
-int
-EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s)
-{
-# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
-        EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, s);
-        return 1;
-# else
-        return EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, s);
-# endif
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
-int
-ssh_EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt)
-{
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, d, cnt);
-        return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
-int
-EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in)
-{
-        return EVP_MD_CTX_copy(out, in);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX
-int
-BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb)
-{
-        if (cb != NULL)
-                fatal("%s: callback args not supported", __func__);
-        return BN_is_prime(p, nchecks, NULL, ctx, NULL);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX
-int
-RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *bn_e, void *cb)
-{
-        RSA *new_rsa, tmp_rsa;
-        unsigned long e;
-
-        if (cb != NULL)
-                fatal("%s: callback args not supported", __func__);
-        e = BN_get_word(bn_e);
-        if (e == 0xffffffffL)
-                fatal("%s: value of e too large", __func__);
-        new_rsa = RSA_generate_key(bits, e, NULL, NULL);
-        if (new_rsa == NULL)
-                return 0;
-        /* swap rsa/new_rsa then free new_rsa */
-        tmp_rsa = *rsa;
-        *rsa = *new_rsa;
-        *new_rsa = tmp_rsa;
-        RSA_free(new_rsa);
-        return 1;
-}
-#endif
+/*
+ * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+ * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
+ * After that, we accept compatible fix and status versions (so we
+ * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
+ * within a patch series.
+ */
 
-#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX
 int
-DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, int bits, const unsigned char *seed,
-    int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, void *cb)
+ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
 {
-        DSA *new_dsa, tmp_dsa;
-
-        if (cb != NULL)
-                fatal("%s: callback args not supported", __func__);
-        new_dsa = DSA_generate_parameters(bits, (unsigned char *)seed, seed_len,
-            counter_ret, h_ret, NULL, NULL);
-        if (new_dsa == NULL)
-                return 0;
-        /* swap dsa/new_dsa then free new_dsa */
-        tmp_dsa = *dsa;
-        *dsa = *new_dsa;
-        *new_dsa = tmp_dsa;
-        DSA_free(new_dsa);
-        return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
-RSA_METHOD *
-RSA_get_default_method(void)
-{
-        return RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+        long mask, hfix, lfix;
+
+        /* exact match is always OK */
+        if (headerver == libver)
+                return 1;
+
+        /* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
+        if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
+                mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
+                return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
+        }
+        
+        /*
+         * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor must match and library
+         * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+         */
+        mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor */
+        hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+        lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+        if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
+                return 1;
+        return 0;
 }
-#endif
 
 #ifdef  USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
 void