* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.org/txt/release-5.7):

  - Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH)
    and host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656.  ECDH and ECDSA
    offer better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent
    symmetric key length, as well as much shorter keys.
  - sftp(1)/sftp-server(8): add a protocol extension to support a hard
    link operation.  It is available through the "ln" command in the
    client.  The old "ln" behaviour of creating a symlink is available
    using its "-s" option or through the preexisting "symlink" command.
  - scp(1): Add a new -3 option to scp: Copies between two remote hosts
    are transferred through the local host (closes: #508613).
  - ssh(1): "atomically" create the listening mux socket by binding it on
    a temporary name and then linking it into position after listen() has
    succeeded.  This allows the mux clients to determine that the server
    socket is either ready or stale without races (closes: #454784).
    Stale server sockets are now automatically removed (closes: #523250).
  - ssh(1): install a SIGCHLD handler to reap expired child process
    (closes: #594687).
  - ssh(1)/ssh-agent(1): honour $TMPDIR for client xauth and ssh-agent
    temporary directories (closes: #357469, although only if you arrange
    for ssh-agent to actually see $TMPDIR since the setgid bit will cause
    it to be stripped off).

1 files changed, 130 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
index e3a428aaa..a455472b3 100644
--- a/platform.c
+++ b/platform.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.3 2009/12/20 23:49:22 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.18 2011/01/11 06:02:25 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
@@ -16,11 +16,27 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-#include "config.h"
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
 #include "platform.h"
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
 
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
 void
 platform_pre_listen(void)
 {
@@ -57,6 +73,118 @@ platform_post_fork_child(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+/* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
+int
+platform_privileged_uidswap(void)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+        /* uid 0 is not special on Cygwin so always try */
+        return 1;
+#else
+        return (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This gets called before switching UIDs, and is called even when sshd is
+ * not running as root.
+ */
+void
+platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+        /* Cache selinux status for later use */
+        (void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+        /* if solaris projects were detected, set the default now */
+        if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+                solaris_set_default_project(pw);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined (__bsdi__)
+        if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+                setpgid(0, 0);
+# endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
+        /*
+         * If we have both LOGIN_CAP and PAM, we want to establish creds
+         * before calling setusercontext (in session.c:do_setusercontext).
+         */
+        if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+                if (options.use_pam) {
+                        do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
+                }
+        }
+# endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID)
+        if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+                /* Sets login uid for accounting */
+                if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+                        error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno));
+        }
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This gets called after we've established the user's groups, and is only
+ * called if sshd is running as root.
+ */
+void
+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
+        /*
+         * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups.
+         * These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() call.
+         * Reestablish them here.
+         */
+        if (options.use_pam) {
+                do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
+        }
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && (defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY))
+        irix_setusercontext(pw);
+#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+        aix_usrinfo(pw);
+#endif /* _AIX */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_LIBIAF)
+        if (set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) {
+                exit(1);
+        }
+# endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
+        /*
+         * If we have a chroot directory, we set all creds except real
+         * uid which we will need for chroot.  If we don't have a
+         * chroot directory, we don't override anything.
+         */
+        {
+                char **creds = NULL, *chroot_creds[] =
+                    { "REAL_USER=root", NULL };
+
+                if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+                    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0)
+                        creds = chroot_creds;
+
+                if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, creds) == -1)
+                        fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
+        }
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+        ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+}
+
 char *
 platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
 {