Merge 6.7p1.

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.

1 files changed, 43 insertions, 35 deletions

diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
index ba2461211..25f10c549 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/ssh-agent.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.183 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.190 2014/07/25 21:22:03 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -49,8 +49,10 @@
 #endif
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
@@ -124,6 +126,9 @@ int max_fd = 0;
 pid_t parent_pid = -1;
 time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
 
+/* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
+pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
+
 /* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
 char socket_name[MAXPATHLEN];
 char socket_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
@@ -221,9 +226,11 @@ process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
         buffer_put_int(&msg, tab->nentries);
         TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) {
                 if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
                         buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n));
                         buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->e);
                         buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->n);
+#endif
                 } else {
                         u_char *blob;
                         u_int blen;
@@ -238,6 +245,7 @@ process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
         buffer_free(&msg);
 }
 
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 /* ssh1 only */
 static void
 process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
@@ -273,7 +281,7 @@ process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
         if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0)) {
                 Key *private = id->key;
                 /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
-                if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa) <= 0)
+                if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa) != 0)
                         goto failure;
 
                 /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
@@ -308,6 +316,7 @@ send:
         BN_clear_free(challenge);
         buffer_free(&msg);
 }
+#endif
 
 /* ssh2 only */
 static void
@@ -359,12 +368,16 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
 static void
 process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 {
-        u_int blen, bits;
+        u_int blen;
         int success = 0;
         Key *key = NULL;
         u_char *blob;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
+        u_int bits;
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
 
         switch (version) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
         case 1:
                 key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
                 bits = buffer_get_int(&e->request);
@@ -375,6 +388,7 @@ process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
                         logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %u, announced %u",
                             key_size(key), bits);
                 break;
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
         case 2:
                 blob = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &blen);
                 key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
@@ -471,6 +485,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
         Key *k = NULL;
 
         switch (version) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
         case 1:
                 k = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
                 (void) buffer_get_int(&e->request);             /* ignored */
@@ -484,7 +499,9 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
                 buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->p);      /* q */
 
                 /* Generate additional parameters */
-                rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa);
+                if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa) != 0)
+                        fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters "
+                            "error", __func__);
 
                 /* enable blinding */
                 if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
@@ -493,6 +510,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
                         goto send;
                 }
                 break;
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
         case 2:
                 k = key_private_deserialize(&e->request);
                 if (k == NULL) {
@@ -501,11 +519,10 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
                 }
                 break;
         }
-        comment = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
-        if (k == NULL) {
-                free(comment);
+        if (k == NULL)
                 goto send;
-        }
+        comment = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+
         while (buffer_len(&e->request)) {
                 switch ((type = buffer_get_char(&e->request))) {
                 case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
@@ -733,6 +750,7 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
         case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK:
                 process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK);
                 break;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
         /* ssh1 */
         case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE:
                 process_authentication_challenge1(e);
@@ -750,6 +768,7 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
         case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES:
                 process_remove_all_identities(e, 1);
                 break;
+#endif
         /* ssh2 */
         case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
                 process_sign_request2(e);
@@ -949,6 +968,7 @@ after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
                                         break;
                                 }
                                 buffer_append(&sockets[i].input, buf, len);
+                                explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
                                 process_message(&sockets[i]);
                         }
                         break;
@@ -960,6 +980,9 @@ after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 static void
 cleanup_socket(void)
 {
+        if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid)
+                return;
+        debug("%s: cleanup", __func__);
         if (socket_name[0])
                 unlink(socket_name);
         if (socket_dir[0])
@@ -1001,15 +1024,10 @@ check_parent_exists(void)
 static void
 usage(void)
 {
-        fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [command [arg ...]]\n",
-            __progname);
-        fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
-        fprintf(stderr, "  -c          Generate C-shell commands on stdout.\n");
-        fprintf(stderr, "  -s          Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout.\n");
-        fprintf(stderr, "  -k          Kill the current agent.\n");
-        fprintf(stderr, "  -d          Debug mode.\n");
-        fprintf(stderr, "  -a socket   Bind agent socket to given name.\n");
-        fprintf(stderr, "  -t life     Default identity lifetime (seconds).\n");
+        fprintf(stderr,
+            "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-d] [-a bind_address] [-t life]\n"
+            "                 [command [arg ...]]\n"
+            "       ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
         exit(1);
 }
 
@@ -1021,17 +1039,16 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         u_int nalloc;
         char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
         fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
-        struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
 #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
         struct rlimit rlim;
 #endif
-        int prev_mask;
         extern int optind;
         extern char *optarg;
         pid_t pid;
         char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
         struct timeval *tvp = NULL;
         size_t len;
+        mode_t prev_mask;
 
         /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
         sanitise_stdfd();
@@ -1045,7 +1062,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
         OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
 
         __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
         seed_rng();
@@ -1142,27 +1161,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
          * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
          * the parent.
          */
-        sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-        if (sock < 0) {
-                perror("socket");
-                *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
-                cleanup_exit(1);
-        }
-        memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
-        sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-        strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, socket_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
         prev_mask = umask(0177);
-        if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
-                perror("bind");
+        sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
+        if (sock < 0) {
+                /* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */
                 *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
-                umask(prev_mask);
                 cleanup_exit(1);
         }
         umask(prev_mask);
-        if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
-                perror("listen");
-                cleanup_exit(1);
-        }
 
         /*
          * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
@@ -1231,6 +1237,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 skip:
 
+        cleanup_pid = getpid();
+
 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
         pkcs11_init(0);
 #endif