diff options
author | Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> | 2014-10-07 13:33:15 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> | 2014-10-07 14:27:30 +0100 |
commit | f0b009aea83e9ff3a50be30f51012099a5143c16 (patch) | |
tree | 3825e6f7e3b7ea4481d06ed89aba9a7a95150df5 /ssh-dss.c | |
parent | 47f0bad4330b16ec3bad870fcf9839c196e42c12 (diff) | |
parent | 762c062828f5a8f6ed189ed6e44ad38fd92f8b36 (diff) |
Merge 6.7p1.
* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
- sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
remove unsafe algorithms. In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
disabled by default. The full set of algorithms remains available if
configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
- ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A
remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
- ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
key types.
- sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
- ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
- sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
- sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
option.
- ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
host, remote user, hostname, port). Helps avoid exceeding miserly
pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
- sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
authentication success / failure messages.
- Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
#734553).
- Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
/proc/self/{mem,maps}.
* Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7. It is true that
dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the other
hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
easily cause more serious problems in practice. It's not entirely clear
what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
* Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
field.
Diffstat (limited to 'ssh-dss.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssh-dss.c | 238 |
1 files changed, 134 insertions, 104 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.31 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ | 1 | /* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.32 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ |
2 | /* | 2 | /* |
3 | * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. |
4 | * | 4 | * |
@@ -28,162 +28,192 @@ | |||
28 | #include <sys/types.h> | 28 | #include <sys/types.h> |
29 | 29 | ||
30 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | 30 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
31 | #include <openssl/dsa.h> | ||
31 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | 32 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
32 | 33 | ||
33 | #include <stdarg.h> | 34 | #include <stdarg.h> |
34 | #include <string.h> | 35 | #include <string.h> |
35 | 36 | ||
36 | #include "xmalloc.h" | 37 | #include "sshbuf.h" |
37 | #include "buffer.h" | ||
38 | #include "compat.h" | 38 | #include "compat.h" |
39 | #include "log.h" | 39 | #include "ssherr.h" |
40 | #include "key.h" | ||
41 | #include "digest.h" | 40 | #include "digest.h" |
41 | #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL | ||
42 | #include "sshkey.h" | ||
42 | 43 | ||
43 | #define INTBLOB_LEN 20 | 44 | #define INTBLOB_LEN 20 |
44 | #define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN) | 45 | #define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN) |
45 | 46 | ||
46 | int | 47 | int |
47 | ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, | 48 | ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, |
48 | const u_char *data, u_int datalen) | 49 | const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) |
49 | { | 50 | { |
50 | DSA_SIG *sig; | 51 | DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; |
51 | u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; | 52 | u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; |
52 | u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); | 53 | size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); |
53 | Buffer b; | 54 | struct sshbuf *b = NULL; |
54 | 55 | int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; | |
55 | if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA || | 56 | |
56 | key->dsa == NULL) { | 57 | if (lenp != NULL) |
57 | error("%s: no DSA key", __func__); | 58 | *lenp = 0; |
58 | return -1; | 59 | if (sigp != NULL) |
59 | } | 60 | *sigp = NULL; |
60 | 61 | ||
61 | if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, | 62 | if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || |
62 | digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) { | 63 | sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA) |
63 | error("%s: ssh_digest_memory failed", __func__); | 64 | return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
64 | return -1; | 65 | if (dlen == 0) |
65 | } | 66 | return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
66 | 67 | ||
67 | sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa); | 68 | if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, |
68 | explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); | 69 | digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) |
69 | 70 | goto out; | |
70 | if (sig == NULL) { | 71 | |
71 | error("ssh_dss_sign: sign failed"); | 72 | if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) { |
72 | return -1; | 73 | ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; |
74 | goto out; | ||
73 | } | 75 | } |
74 | 76 | ||
75 | rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r); | 77 | rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r); |
76 | slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s); | 78 | slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s); |
77 | if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) { | 79 | if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) { |
78 | error("bad sig size %u %u", rlen, slen); | 80 | ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
79 | DSA_SIG_free(sig); | 81 | goto out; |
80 | return -1; | ||
81 | } | 82 | } |
82 | explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); | 83 | explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); |
83 | BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); | 84 | BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); |
84 | BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); | 85 | BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); |
85 | DSA_SIG_free(sig); | ||
86 | 86 | ||
87 | if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { | 87 | if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { |
88 | if (lenp != NULL) | ||
89 | *lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN; | ||
90 | if (sigp != NULL) { | 88 | if (sigp != NULL) { |
91 | *sigp = xmalloc(SIGBLOB_LEN); | 89 | if ((*sigp = malloc(SIGBLOB_LEN)) == NULL) { |
90 | ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; | ||
91 | goto out; | ||
92 | } | ||
92 | memcpy(*sigp, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); | 93 | memcpy(*sigp, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); |
93 | } | 94 | } |
95 | if (lenp != NULL) | ||
96 | *lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN; | ||
97 | ret = 0; | ||
94 | } else { | 98 | } else { |
95 | /* ietf-drafts */ | 99 | /* ietf-drafts */ |
96 | buffer_init(&b); | 100 | if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { |
97 | buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-dss"); | 101 | ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
98 | buffer_put_string(&b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); | 102 | goto out; |
99 | len = buffer_len(&b); | 103 | } |
100 | if (lenp != NULL) | 104 | if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-dss")) != 0 || |
101 | *lenp = len; | 105 | (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN)) != 0) |
106 | goto out; | ||
107 | len = sshbuf_len(b); | ||
102 | if (sigp != NULL) { | 108 | if (sigp != NULL) { |
103 | *sigp = xmalloc(len); | 109 | if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { |
104 | memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len); | 110 | ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
111 | goto out; | ||
112 | } | ||
113 | memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); | ||
105 | } | 114 | } |
106 | buffer_free(&b); | 115 | if (lenp != NULL) |
116 | *lenp = len; | ||
117 | ret = 0; | ||
107 | } | 118 | } |
108 | return 0; | 119 | out: |
120 | explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); | ||
121 | if (sig != NULL) | ||
122 | DSA_SIG_free(sig); | ||
123 | if (b != NULL) | ||
124 | sshbuf_free(b); | ||
125 | return ret; | ||
109 | } | 126 | } |
127 | |||
110 | int | 128 | int |
111 | ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, | 129 | ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, |
112 | const u_char *data, u_int datalen) | 130 | const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, |
131 | const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) | ||
113 | { | 132 | { |
114 | DSA_SIG *sig; | 133 | DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; |
115 | u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob; | 134 | u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL; |
116 | u_int len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); | 135 | size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); |
117 | int rlen, ret; | 136 | int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
118 | Buffer b; | 137 | struct sshbuf *b = NULL; |
119 | 138 | char *ktype = NULL; | |
120 | if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA || | 139 | |
121 | key->dsa == NULL) { | 140 | if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || |
122 | error("%s: no DSA key", __func__); | 141 | sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA) |
123 | return -1; | 142 | return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
124 | } | 143 | if (dlen == 0) |
144 | return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
125 | 145 | ||
126 | /* fetch signature */ | 146 | /* fetch signature */ |
127 | if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { | 147 | if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { |
128 | sigblob = xmalloc(signaturelen); | 148 | if ((sigblob = malloc(signaturelen)) == NULL) |
149 | return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; | ||
129 | memcpy(sigblob, signature, signaturelen); | 150 | memcpy(sigblob, signature, signaturelen); |
130 | len = signaturelen; | 151 | len = signaturelen; |
131 | } else { | 152 | } else { |
132 | /* ietf-drafts */ | 153 | /* ietf-drafts */ |
133 | char *ktype; | 154 | if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) |
134 | buffer_init(&b); | 155 | return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
135 | buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen); | 156 | if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || |
136 | ktype = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); | 157 | sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { |
158 | ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; | ||
159 | goto out; | ||
160 | } | ||
137 | if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) { | 161 | if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) { |
138 | error("%s: cannot handle type %s", __func__, ktype); | 162 | ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; |
139 | buffer_free(&b); | 163 | goto out; |
140 | free(ktype); | ||
141 | return -1; | ||
142 | } | 164 | } |
143 | free(ktype); | 165 | if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { |
144 | sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); | 166 | ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; |
145 | rlen = buffer_len(&b); | 167 | goto out; |
146 | buffer_free(&b); | ||
147 | if (rlen != 0) { | ||
148 | error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", | ||
149 | __func__, rlen); | ||
150 | free(sigblob); | ||
151 | return -1; | ||
152 | } | 168 | } |
153 | } | 169 | } |
154 | 170 | ||
155 | if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) { | 171 | if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) { |
156 | fatal("bad sigbloblen %u != SIGBLOB_LEN", len); | 172 | ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
173 | goto out; | ||
157 | } | 174 | } |
158 | 175 | ||
159 | /* parse signature */ | 176 | /* parse signature */ |
160 | if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) | 177 | if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL || |
161 | fatal("%s: DSA_SIG_new failed", __func__); | 178 | (sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL || |
162 | if ((sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL) | 179 | (sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL) { |
163 | fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); | 180 | ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; |
164 | if ((sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL) | 181 | goto out; |
165 | fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_new failed"); | 182 | } |
166 | if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) || | 183 | if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) || |
167 | (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL)) | 184 | (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL)) { |
168 | fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__); | 185 | ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; |
169 | 186 | goto out; | |
170 | /* clean up */ | 187 | } |
171 | explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); | ||
172 | free(sigblob); | ||
173 | 188 | ||
174 | /* sha1 the data */ | 189 | /* sha1 the data */ |
175 | if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, | 190 | if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, |
176 | digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) { | 191 | digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) |
177 | error("%s: digest_memory failed", __func__); | 192 | goto out; |
178 | return -1; | 193 | |
194 | switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) { | ||
195 | case 1: | ||
196 | ret = 0; | ||
197 | break; | ||
198 | case 0: | ||
199 | ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; | ||
200 | goto out; | ||
201 | default: | ||
202 | ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; | ||
203 | goto out; | ||
179 | } | 204 | } |
180 | 205 | ||
181 | ret = DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa); | 206 | out: |
182 | explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); | 207 | explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); |
183 | 208 | if (sig != NULL) | |
184 | DSA_SIG_free(sig); | 209 | DSA_SIG_free(sig); |
185 | 210 | if (b != NULL) | |
186 | debug("%s: signature %s", __func__, | 211 | sshbuf_free(b); |
187 | ret == 1 ? "correct" : ret == 0 ? "incorrect" : "error"); | 212 | if (ktype != NULL) |
213 | free(ktype); | ||
214 | if (sigblob != NULL) { | ||
215 | explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); | ||
216 | free(sigblob); | ||
217 | } | ||
188 | return ret; | 218 | return ret; |
189 | } | 219 | } |