GSSAPI key exchange support

This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
years.  This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface.  This one is
particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
system resources."

However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
-krb5 packages (as we used to have).  It seems to have a generally good
security history.

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
Last-Updated: 2015-09-17

Patch-Name: gssapi.patch

1 files changed, 120 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index fcaed6b01..44c89e691 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -160,9 +160,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
         struct kex *kex;
         int r;
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
+        char *gss_host = NULL;
+#endif
+
         xxx_host = host;
         xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
+                /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this 
+                 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+                orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+                if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+                        gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
+                else
+                        gss_host = host;
+
+                gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
+                if (gss) {
+                        debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+                        xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+                            "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+                }
+        }
+#endif
+
         if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
                 logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
                 options.ciphers = NULL;
@@ -200,6 +225,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
         myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
             myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+         * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+        if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
+                orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+                xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], 
+                    "%s,null", orig);
+                free(gss);
+        }
+#endif
+
         if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
                 packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
                     (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
@@ -218,10 +254,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
 # endif
 #endif
         kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+        }
+#endif
         kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
         kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
         kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
+                kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
+                kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
+                kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
+                if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+                        kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
+                } else {
+                        kex->gss_host = gss_host;
+        }
+        }
+#endif
+
         dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
 
         if (options.use_roaming && !kex->roaming) {
@@ -313,6 +369,7 @@ int	input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
 int     input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
 int     input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 int     input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int     userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
 #endif
 
 void    userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
@@ -328,6 +385,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
 
 Authmethod authmethods[] = {
 #ifdef GSSAPI
+        {"gssapi-keyex",
+                userauth_gsskeyex,
+                NULL,
+                &options.gss_authentication,
+                NULL},
         {"gssapi-with-mic",
                 userauth_gssapi,
                 NULL,
@@ -634,19 +696,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
         static u_int mech = 0;
         OM_uint32 min;
         int ok = 0;
+        const char *gss_host;
+
+        if (options.gss_server_identity)
+                gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
+        else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+                gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
+        else
+                gss_host = authctxt->host;
 
         /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
          * once. */
 
         if (gss_supported == NULL)
-                gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
+                if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
+                        gss_supported = NULL;
+                        return 0;
+                }
 
         /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
         while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
                 /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
                 if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
                     ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
-                    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
+                    &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, 
+                    options.gss_client_identity)) {
                         ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
                 } else {
                         mech++;
@@ -743,8 +817,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
 {
         Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
         Gssctxt *gssctxt;
-        int oidlen;
-        char *oidv;
+        u_int oidlen;
+        u_char *oidv;
 
         if (authctxt == NULL)
                 fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
@@ -857,6 +931,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
         free(lang);
         return 0;
 }
+
+int
+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+        Buffer b;
+        gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+        gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+        OM_uint32 ms;
+
+        static int attempt = 0;
+        if (attempt++ >= 1)
+                return (0);
+
+        if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
+                debug("No valid Key exchange context"); 
+                return (0);
+        }
+
+        ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
+            "gssapi-keyex");
+
+        gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+        gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
+                buffer_free(&b);
+                return (0);
+        }
+
+        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+        packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
+        packet_send();
+
+        buffer_free(&b);
+        gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
+
+        return (1);
+}
+
 #endif /* GSSAPI */
 
 int