Debian release 3.6p1-1.

1 files changed, 23 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 35685643f..d49973859 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.260 2002/09/27 10:42:09 mickey Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.263 2003/02/16 17:09:57 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ int *startup_pipes = NULL;
 int startup_pipe;               /* in child */
 
 /* variables used for privilege separation */
-extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
-extern int use_privsep;
+int use_privsep;
+struct monitor *pmonitor;
 
 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
@@ -827,9 +827,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         __progname = get_progname(av[0]);
         init_rng();
 
-        /* Save argv. */
+        /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
         saved_argc = ac;
         saved_argv = av;
+        saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * ac);
+        for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+                saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+        /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+        compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
+#endif
 
         /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
         initialize_server_options(&options);
@@ -949,7 +957,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
             SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
             options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
             SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
-            !inetd_flag);
+            log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
 
 #ifdef _UNICOS
         /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now!
@@ -1063,8 +1071,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #else
                 if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
 #endif
-                        fatal("Bad owner or mode for %s",
-                            _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+                        fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
+                            "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
         }
 
         /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
@@ -1397,8 +1405,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
          * setlogin() affects the entire process group.  We don't
          * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
          */
-#if 0
-        /* XXX: this breaks Solaris */
+#if !defined(STREAMS_PUSH_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+        /*
+         * If setsid is called on Solaris, sshd will acquire the controlling
+         * terminal while pushing STREAMS modules. This will prevent the
+         * shell from acquiring it later.
+         */
         if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
                 error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 #endif
@@ -1811,6 +1823,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
 
         /* start key exchange */
         kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+        kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
         kex->server = 1;
         kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
         kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;