Import openssh_7.4p1.orig.tar.gz

1 files changed, 64 insertions, 536 deletions

diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 799c7711f..1dc4d182a 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.470 2016/05/24 04:43:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.480 2016/12/09 03:04:29 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "sshpty.h"
@@ -115,7 +114,6 @@
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "channels.h"
 #include "session.h"
-#include "monitor_mm.h"
 #include "monitor.h"
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
@@ -125,10 +123,6 @@
 #include "version.h"
 #include "ssherr.h"
 
-#ifndef O_NOCTTY
-#define O_NOCTTY        0
-#endif
-
 /* Re-exec fds */
 #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD    (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
 #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD          (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
@@ -201,22 +195,12 @@ int have_agent = 0;
  * not very useful.  Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
  */
 struct {
-        Key     *server_key;            /* ephemeral server key */
-        Key     *ssh1_host_key;         /* ssh1 host key */
         Key     **host_keys;            /* all private host keys */
         Key     **host_pubkeys;         /* all public host keys */
         Key     **host_certificates;    /* all public host certificates */
-        int     have_ssh1_key;
         int     have_ssh2_key;
-        u_char  ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
 } sensitive_data;
 
-/*
- * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
- * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
- */
-static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
-
 /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
@@ -255,10 +239,6 @@ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
 void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
-#endif
 static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
 
 /*
@@ -310,6 +290,8 @@ static void
 sighup_restart(void)
 {
         logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
+        if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+                unlink(options.pid_file);
         platform_pre_restart();
         close_listen_socks();
         close_startup_pipes();
@@ -375,64 +357,17 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
             ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ssh_remote_port(active_state));
 }
 
-/*
- * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm.  Note that this
- * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
- * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
- * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
- * problems.
- */
-static void
-generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
-{
-        verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
-            sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
-        if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
-                key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
-        sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
-            options.server_key_bits);
-        verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
-
-        arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
-}
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
-{
-        int save_errno = errno;
-
-        signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
-        errno = save_errno;
-        key_do_regen = 1;
-}
-
 static void
 sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
 {
         u_int i;
-        int mismatch;
         int remote_major, remote_minor;
-        int major, minor;
         char *s, *newline = "\n";
         char buf[256];                  /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
         char remote_version[256];       /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
 
-        if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
-            (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) {
-                major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
-                minor = 99;
-        } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
-                major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2;
-                minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2;
-                newline = "\r\n";
-        } else {
-                major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
-                minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
-        }
-
         xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
-            major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
+            PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
             *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
             options.version_addendum, newline);
 
@@ -511,42 +446,13 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
                     "refusing connection", remote_version);
         }
 
-        mismatch = 0;
-        switch (remote_major) {
-        case 1:
-                if (remote_minor == 99) {
-                        if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
-                                enable_compat20();
-                        else
-                                mismatch = 1;
-                        break;
-                }
-                if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
-                        mismatch = 1;
-                        break;
-                }
-                if (remote_minor < 3) {
-                        packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
-                            "is no longer supported.  Please install a newer version.");
-                } else if (remote_minor == 3) {
-                        /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
-                        enable_compat13();
-                }
-                break;
-        case 2:
-                if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
-                        enable_compat20();
-                        break;
-                }
-                /* FALLTHROUGH */
-        default:
-                mismatch = 1;
-                break;
-        }
         chop(server_version_string);
         debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
 
-        if (mismatch) {
+        if (remote_major == 2 ||
+            (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99)) {
+                enable_compat20();
+        } else {
                 s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
                 (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
                 close(sock_in);
@@ -565,10 +471,6 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
 {
         int i;
 
-        if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
-                key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
-                sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
-        }
         for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
                 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
                         key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
@@ -579,8 +481,6 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
                         sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
                 }
         }
-        sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
-        explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
 }
 
 /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
@@ -590,30 +490,40 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
         Key *tmp;
         int i;
 
-        if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
-                tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
-                key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
-                sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
-        }
-
         for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
                 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
                         tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
                         key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
                         sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
-                        if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
-                                sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
                 }
                 /* Certs do not need demotion */
         }
+}
+
+static void
+reseed_prngs(void)
+{
+        u_int32_t rnd[256];
 
-        /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie.  XXX - Okay Niels? */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+        RAND_poll();
+#endif
+        arc4random_stir(); /* noop on recent arc4random() implementations */
+        arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* let arc4random notice PID change */
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+        RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+        /* give libcrypto a chance to notice the PID change */
+        if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
+                fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
+#endif
+
+        explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 }
 
 static void
 privsep_preauth_child(void)
 {
-        u_int32_t rnd[256];
         gid_t gidset[1];
 
         /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
@@ -625,14 +535,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
                 ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
 #endif
 
-        arc4random_stir();
-        arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-        RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-        if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
-                fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
-#endif
-        explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+        reseed_prngs();
 
         /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
         demote_sensitive_data();
@@ -689,9 +592,6 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
                         ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
                 monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
 
-                /* Sync memory */
-                monitor_sync(pmonitor);
-
                 /* Wait for the child's exit status */
                 while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) {
                         if (errno == EINTR)
@@ -731,12 +631,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 static void
 privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
-        u_int32_t rnd[256];
-
 #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
         if (1) {
 #else
-        if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
+        if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
 #endif
                 /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
                 use_privsep = 0;
@@ -766,14 +664,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
         /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
         demote_sensitive_data();
 
-        arc4random_stir();
-        arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-        RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-        if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
-                fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
-#endif
-        explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+        reseed_prngs();
 
         /* Drop privileges */
         do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
@@ -803,7 +694,7 @@ list_hostkey_types(void)
                 key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
                 if (key == NULL)
                         key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
-                if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+                if (key == NULL)
                         continue;
                 /* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */
                 if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
@@ -952,7 +843,7 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
         for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
                 key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
                 if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
-                    key->type == KEY_RSA1 || sshkey_is_cert(key))
+                    sshkey_is_cert(key))
                         continue;
                 fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
                     SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
@@ -1018,10 +909,9 @@ usage(void)
 #endif
         );
         fprintf(stderr,
-"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
+"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
 "            [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
-"            [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
-"            [-u len]\n"
+"            [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
         );
         exit(1);
 }
@@ -1038,13 +928,6 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
         /*
          * Protocol from reexec master to child:
          *      string  configuration
-         *      u_int   ephemeral_key_follows
-         *      bignum  e               (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1)
-         *      bignum  n                       "
-         *      bignum  d                       "
-         *      bignum  iqmp                    "
-         *      bignum  p                       "
-         *      bignum  q                       "
          *      string rngseed          (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
          */
         if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
@@ -1052,28 +935,6 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
         if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
                 fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-        if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
-            sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
-                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
-                    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
-                    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
-                    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
-                    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
-                    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p)) != 0 ||
-                    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(m,
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q)) != 0)
-                        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-        } else
-#endif
-                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0)
-                        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-
 #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
         rexec_send_rng_seed(m);
 #endif
@@ -1107,24 +968,6 @@ recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
                 buffer_append(conf, cp, len);
         free(cp);
 
-        if (buffer_get_int(&m)) {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-                if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
-                        key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
-                sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
-                buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
-                buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
-                buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
-                buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
-                buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
-                buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
-                if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
-                        fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters "
-                            "error", __func__);
-#endif
-        }
-
 #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
         rexec_recv_rng_seed(&m);
 #endif
@@ -1248,7 +1091,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
 {
         fd_set *fdset;
         int i, j, ret, maxfd;
-        int key_used = 0, startups = 0;
+        int startups = 0;
         int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 };
         struct sockaddr_storage from;
         socklen_t fromlen;
@@ -1295,11 +1138,6 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
                                 unlink(options.pid_file);
                         exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
                 }
-                if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
-                        generate_ephemeral_server_key();
-                        key_used = 0;
-                        key_do_regen = 0;
-                }
                 if (ret < 0)
                         continue;
 
@@ -1336,7 +1174,15 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
                                 continue;
                         }
                         if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
-                                debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
+                                char *laddr = get_local_ipaddr(*newsock);
+                                char *raddr = get_peer_ipaddr(*newsock);
+
+                                verbose("drop connection #%d from [%s]:%d "
+                                    "on [%s]:%d past MaxStartups", startups,
+                                    raddr, get_peer_port(*newsock),
+                                    laddr, get_local_port(*newsock));
+                                free(laddr);
+                                free(raddr);
                                 close(*newsock);
                                 continue;
                         }
@@ -1434,19 +1280,6 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
                                 close(config_s[0]);
                                 close(config_s[1]);
                         }
-
-                        /*
-                         * Mark that the key has been used (it
-                         * was "given" to the child).
-                         */
-                        if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
-                            key_used == 0) {
-                                /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
-                                signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
-                                alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
-                                key_used = 1;
-                        }
-
                         close(*newsock);
 
                         /*
@@ -1486,8 +1319,8 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
 #ifdef IP_OPTIONS
         int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
         struct sockaddr_storage from;
-        socklen_t option_size, i, fromlen = sizeof(from);
         u_char opts[200];
+        socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from);
         char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1];
 
         memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
@@ -1520,7 +1353,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
         extern char *optarg;
         extern int optind;
-        int r, opt, i, j, on = 1;
+        int r, opt, i, j, on = 1, already_daemon;
         int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
         const char *remote_ip;
         int remote_port;
@@ -1619,8 +1452,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
                         options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
                         break;
                 case 'b':
-                        options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256,
-                            32768, NULL);
+                        /* protocol 1, ignored */
                         break;
                 case 'p':
                         options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
@@ -1641,10 +1473,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
                         }
                         break;
                 case 'k':
-                        if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
-                                fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
-                                exit(1);
-                        }
+                        /* protocol 1, ignored */
                         break;
                 case 'h':
                         if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
@@ -1726,9 +1555,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         drop_cray_privs();
 #endif
 
-        sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
-        sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
-        sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
         sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
 
         /*
@@ -1781,9 +1607,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
          * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
          */
         if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
-                if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1))
-                        fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with "
-                            "SSH protocol 1");
                 for (n = 0; n < options.num_auth_methods; n++) {
                         if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[n],
                             1) == 0)
@@ -1852,8 +1675,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
                 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
                 sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
 
-                if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type != KEY_RSA1 &&
-                    have_agent) {
+                if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && have_agent) {
                         debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s",
                             options.host_key_files[i]);
                         keytype = pubkey->type;
@@ -1868,10 +1690,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
                 }
 
                 switch (keytype) {
-                case KEY_RSA1:
-                        sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
-                        sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
-                        break;
                 case KEY_RSA:
                 case KEY_DSA:
                 case KEY_ECDSA:
@@ -1884,19 +1702,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
                     SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                         fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
                 debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s",
-                    key ? "private" : "agent", i, keytype == KEY_RSA1 ?
-                    sshkey_type(pubkey) : sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
+                    key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
                 free(fp);
         }
-        if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
-                logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
-                options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
-        }
-        if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
-                logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
-                options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
-        }
-        if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+        if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
                 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
                 exit(1);
         }
@@ -1944,33 +1753,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
                     key_type(key));
         }
 
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-        /* Check certain values for sanity. */
-        if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
-                if (options.server_key_bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
-                    options.server_key_bits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-                        fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
-                        exit(1);
-                }
-                /*
-                 * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
-                 * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
-                 * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
-                 */
-                if (options.server_key_bits >
-                    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
-                    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
-                    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
-                    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
-                        options.server_key_bits =
-                            BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
-                            SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
-                        debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
-                            options.server_key_bits);
-                }
-        }
-#endif
-
         if (use_privsep) {
                 struct stat st;
 
@@ -2030,25 +1812,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
 
         /*
-         * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
-         * from the controlling terminal, and fork.  The original process
-         * exits.
+         * If not in debugging mode, not started from inetd and not already
+         * daemonized (eg re-exec via SIGHUP), disconnect from the controlling
+         * terminal, and fork.  The original process exits.
          */
-        if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
-#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
-                int fd;
-#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+        already_daemon = daemonized();
+        if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag || already_daemon)) {
+
                 if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
                         fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
 
-                /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
-#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
-                fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
-                if (fd >= 0) {
-                        (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
-                        close(fd);
-                }
-#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+                disconnect_controlling_tty();
         }
         /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
         log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
@@ -2068,9 +1842,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
                 platform_pre_listen();
                 server_listen();
 
-                if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
-                        generate_ephemeral_server_key();
-
                 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
                 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
                 signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
@@ -2220,11 +1991,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
                 alarm(options.login_grace_time);
 
         sshd_exchange_identification(ssh, sock_in, sock_out);
-
-        /* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */
-        if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
-                generate_ephemeral_server_key();
-
         packet_set_nonblocking();
 
         /* allocate authentication context */
@@ -2242,7 +2008,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         if (use_privsep) {
                 if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
                         goto authenticated;
-        } else if (compat20 && have_agent) {
+        } else if (have_agent) {
                 if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
                         error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r));
                         have_agent = 0;
@@ -2251,17 +2017,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
         /* perform the key exchange */
         /* authenticate user and start session */
-        if (compat20) {
-                do_ssh2_kex();
-                do_authentication2(authctxt);
-        } else {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-                do_ssh1_kex();
-                do_authentication(authctxt);
-#else
-                fatal("ssh1 not supported");
-#endif
-        }
+        do_ssh2_kex();
+        do_authentication2(authctxt);
+
         /*
          * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
          * the current keystate and exits
@@ -2309,16 +2067,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         if (use_privsep) {
                 privsep_postauth(authctxt);
                 /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
-                if (!compat20)
-                        destroy_sensitive_data();
         }
 
         packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
             options.client_alive_count_max);
 
         /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
-        if (compat20)
-                notify_hostkeys(active_state);
+        notify_hostkeys(active_state);
 
         /* Start session. */
         do_authenticated(authctxt);
@@ -2347,229 +2102,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         exit(0);
 }
 
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-/*
- * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
- * (key with larger modulus first).
- */
-int
-ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
-{
-        struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
-        int rsafail = 0;
-
-        if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
-            sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
-                /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
-                if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
-                    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
-                    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
-                        fatal("do_connection: %s port %d: "
-                            "server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
-                            ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-                            BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
-                            BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
-                            SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
-                }
-                if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
-                        rsafail++;
-                if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-                    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0)
-                        rsafail++;
-        } else {
-                /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
-                if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
-                    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) +
-                    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
-                        fatal("do_connection: %s port %d: "
-                            "host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
-                            ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-                            BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
-                            BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
-                            SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
-                }
-                if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-                    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0)
-                        rsafail++;
-                if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
-                        rsafail++;
-        }
-        return (rsafail);
-}
-
-/*
- * SSH1 key exchange
- */
-static void
-do_ssh1_kex(void)
-{
-        struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
-        int i, len;
-        int rsafail = 0;
-        BIGNUM *session_key_int, *fake_key_int, *real_key_int;
-        u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
-        u_char fake_key_bytes[4096 / 8];
-        size_t fake_key_len;
-        u_char cookie[8];
-        u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
-
-        /*
-         * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
-         * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
-         * spoofing attacks.  Note that this only works against somebody
-         * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
-         * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
-         * cookie.  This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
-         * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
-         */
-        arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
-
-        /*
-         * Send our public key.  We include in the packet 64 bits of random
-         * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
-         * spoofing.
-         */
-        packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
-        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-                packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
-
-        /* Store our public server RSA key. */
-        packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
-        packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
-        packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
-
-        /* Store our public host RSA key. */
-        packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
-        packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
-        packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
-
-        /* Put protocol flags. */
-        packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
-
-        /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
-        packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
-
-        /* Declare supported authentication types. */
-        auth_mask = 0;
-        if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
-                auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
-        if (options.rsa_authentication)
-                auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
-        if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
-                auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
-        if (options.password_authentication)
-                auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
-        packet_put_int(auth_mask);
-
-        /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
-        packet_send();
-        packet_write_wait();
-
-        debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
-            BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
-            BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
-
-        /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
-        packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
-
-        /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
-        cipher_type = packet_get_char();
-
-        if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
-                packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
-
-        /* Get check bytes from the packet.  These must match those we
-           sent earlier with the public key packet. */
-        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-                if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
-                        packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
-
-        debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
-
-        /* Get the encrypted integer. */
-        if ((real_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
-                fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
-        packet_get_bignum(real_key_int);
-
-        protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
-        packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
-        packet_check_eom();
-
-        /* Setup a fake key in case RSA decryption fails */
-        if ((fake_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
-                fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
-        fake_key_len = BN_num_bytes(real_key_int);
-        if (fake_key_len > sizeof(fake_key_bytes))
-                fake_key_len = sizeof(fake_key_bytes);
-        arc4random_buf(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len);
-        if (BN_bin2bn(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len, fake_key_int) == NULL)
-                fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_bin2bn failed");
-
-        /* Decrypt real_key_int using host/server keys */
-        rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(real_key_int));
-        /* If decryption failed, use the fake key. Else, the real key. */
-        if (rsafail)
-                session_key_int = fake_key_int;
-        else
-                session_key_int = real_key_int;
-
-        /*
-         * Extract session key from the decrypted integer.  The key is in the
-         * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
-         * key is in the highest bits.
-         */
-        (void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
-        len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
-        if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
-                error("%s: bad session key len from %s port %d: "
-                    "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", __func__,
-                    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-                    len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
-                rsafail++;
-        } else {
-                explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
-                BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
-                    session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
-
-                derive_ssh1_session_id(
-                    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
-                    cookie, session_id);
-                /*
-                 * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
-                 * session id.
-                 */
-                for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-                        session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
-        }
-
-        /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
-        destroy_sensitive_data();
-
-        if (use_privsep)
-                mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
-
-        /* Destroy the decrypted integer.  It is no longer needed. */
-        BN_clear_free(real_key_int);
-        BN_clear_free(fake_key_int);
-
-        /* Set the session key.  From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
-        packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
-
-        /* Destroy our copy of the session key.  It is no longer needed. */
-        explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
-
-        debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
-
-        /* Send an acknowledgment packet.  Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
-        packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
-        packet_send();
-        packet_write_wait();
-}
-#endif
-
 int
 sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen,
     const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int flag)
@@ -2618,10 +2150,6 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
         if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
                 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
                     myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
-        } else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
-                myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
-                    myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
-                    "none,zlib@openssh.com";
         }
 
         if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)