1 files changed, 34 insertions, 34 deletions

diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
index 558bbbef6..377d72fa9 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.35 2016/06/19 07:48:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.41 2016/10/24 01:09:17 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler.  All rights reserved.
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-#include <sys/param.h>  /* MIN MAX */
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 
@@ -197,7 +196,7 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
 }
 
 char *
-key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only)
+sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, char sep)
 {
         char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
         size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
@@ -209,7 +208,7 @@ key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only)
                 if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
                         continue;
                 if (ret != NULL)
-                        ret[rlen++] = '\n';
+                        ret[rlen++] = sep;
                 nlen = strlen(kt->name);
                 if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
                         free(ret);
@@ -514,7 +513,6 @@ sshkey_new(int type)
         default:
                 free(k);
                 return NULL;
-                break;
         }
 
         if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
@@ -889,9 +887,12 @@ sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
                 int nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n);
                 int elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e);
 
+                if (nlen < 0 || elen < 0 || nlen >= INT_MAX - elen) {
+                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+                        goto out;
+                }
                 blob_len = nlen + elen;
-                if (nlen >= INT_MAX - elen ||
-                    (blob = malloc(blob_len)) == NULL) {
+                if ((blob = malloc(blob_len)) == NULL) {
                         r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
                         goto out;
                 }
@@ -1083,10 +1084,10 @@ fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len,
                         y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1;
 
                         /* assure we are still in bounds */
-                        x = MAX(x, 0);
-                        y = MAX(y, 0);
-                        x = MIN(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1);
-                        y = MIN(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
+                        x = MAXIMUM(x, 0);
+                        y = MAXIMUM(y, 0);
+                        x = MINIMUM(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1);
+                        y = MINIMUM(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
 
                         /* augment the field */
                         if (field[x][y] < len - 2)
@@ -1127,7 +1128,7 @@ fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len,
         for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) {
                 *p++ = '|';
                 for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
-                        *p++ = augmentation_string[MIN(field[x][y], len)];
+                        *p++ = augmentation_string[MINIMUM(field[x][y], len)];
                 *p++ = '|';
                 *p++ = '\n';
         }
@@ -2863,6 +2864,14 @@ sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
         BIGNUM *order, *x, *y, *tmp;
         int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
 
+        /*
+         * NB. This assumes OpenSSL has already verified that the public
+         * point lies on the curve. This is done by EC_POINT_oct2point()
+         * implicitly calling EC_POINT_is_on_curve(). If this code is ever
+         * reachable with public points not unmarshalled using
+         * EC_POINT_oct2point then the caller will need to explicitly check.
+         */
+
         if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
                 return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
         BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
@@ -3030,13 +3039,11 @@ sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
         size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen;
         u_int check;
         int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext;
+        struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
         const struct sshcipher *cipher;
         const char *kdfname = KDFNAME;
         struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL;
 
-        memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
-
         if (rounds <= 0)
                 rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS;
         if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) {
@@ -3123,7 +3130,7 @@ sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
         if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded,
             sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
                 goto out;
-        if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp,
+        if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp,
             sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0)
                 goto out;
 
@@ -3155,7 +3162,7 @@ sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
         sshbuf_free(kdf);
         sshbuf_free(encoded);
         sshbuf_free(encrypted);
-        cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
+        cipher_free(ciphercontext);
         explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt));
         if (key != NULL) {
                 explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
@@ -3184,12 +3191,11 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
         size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0;
         struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL;
         struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
-        struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext;
+        struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
         struct sshkey *k = NULL;
         u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp, pad, last;
         u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2;
 
-        memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
         if (keyp != NULL)
                 *keyp = NULL;
         if (commentp != NULL)
@@ -3318,7 +3324,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
             (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
             key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0)
                 goto out;
-        if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded),
+        if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded),
             encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) {
                 /* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */
                 if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
@@ -3372,7 +3378,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
         }
  out:
         pad = 0;
-        cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
+        cipher_free(ciphercontext);
         free(ciphername);
         free(kdfname);
         free(comment);
@@ -3406,7 +3412,7 @@ sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
         struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL, *encrypted = NULL;
         u_char buf[8];
         int r, cipher_num;
-        struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext;
+        struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
         const struct sshcipher *cipher;
         u_char *cp;
 
@@ -3476,16 +3482,14 @@ sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
         if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
             CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0)
                 goto out;
-        if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp,
+        if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp,
             sshbuf_ptr(buffer), sshbuf_len(buffer), 0, 0)) != 0)
                 goto out;
-        if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext)) != 0)
-                goto out;
 
         r = sshbuf_putb(blob, encrypted);
 
  out:
-        explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+        cipher_free(ciphercontext);
         explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
         sshbuf_free(buffer);
         sshbuf_free(encrypted);
@@ -3655,7 +3659,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase,
         struct sshbuf *decrypted = NULL, *copy = NULL;
         u_char *cp;
         char *comment = NULL;
-        struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext;
+        struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
         const struct sshcipher *cipher;
         struct sshkey *prv = NULL;
 
@@ -3713,12 +3717,8 @@ sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase,
         if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
             CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0)
                 goto out;
-        if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp,
-            sshbuf_ptr(copy), sshbuf_len(copy), 0, 0)) != 0) {
-                cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
-                goto out;
-        }
-        if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext)) != 0)
+        if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp,
+            sshbuf_ptr(copy), sshbuf_len(copy), 0, 0)) != 0)
                 goto out;
 
         if ((r = sshbuf_get_u16(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 ||
@@ -3755,7 +3755,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase,
                 comment = NULL;
         }
  out:
-        explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+        cipher_free(ciphercontext);
         free(comment);
         sshkey_free(prv);
         sshbuf_free(copy);